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"To believe in something not yet 
proved and to underwrite it with our 
lives; it is the only way we can leave 
the future open. Man surrounded by 
facts, permitting himself no surmise, 
no intuitive flash, no great hypothesis, 
no risk is in a locked cell. Ignorance 
cannot seal the mind and imagination 
more surely. To find the point where 
hypothesjs and fact meet; the delicate 
equilibrium between dream and reality; 
the place where fantasy and earthy 
things are metamorphosised into a work 
of art; the hour when faith in the 
future becomes knowledge of the past; 
to lay down one's powers for others 
in need; to shake off the old ordeal 
and get ready for the new; to question, 
knowing that never can the full answer 
be found; to accept uncertainties 
quietly, even our incomplete knowledge 
of God: this is what man's journey is 
about, I think." 
(The previous paragraph is the last 




Let us imagine that we are members of a Marine fighting 
group in the jungles of Vietnam. We have a task to perform. Our 
group is composed of a radioman, a medic, a grenade launcher, and 
several riflemen. Each Marine, including the officer in charge, 
supplies the group with his own special training background and 
information. Varying conditions on missions call for decisions 
involving special items of information from each of the members. Does 
it appear that the amount of trust we have in each other might make a 
difference as we communicate these items of information and guide our 
actions accordingly? 
Or, let us suppose that we are members of a college 
basketball team. Here, again, we belong to a task-oriented group. 
Each individual (guards, forwards, and center) has training and 
knowledge unique to his position and responsibility on the team. 
Spontaneous group decisions involving these special talents and items 
of information are frequently necessary. Does it seem that the amount 
of trust we have in each other might make a difference as we attempt to 
win basketball games? 
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Importance of the Problem 
These examples illustrate ways in which interpersonal trust 
could plausibly contribute to, or deter, the work of a task-oriented 
group. It seems apparent that the study of interpersonal trust in 
communication is important. However, it has not received careful study. 
In the communications literature, trust has been given theoretical 
treatment, but few scholars in the behavioral sciences have attempted 
to study it in depth. 
Intuition and casual observation support_the contention that 
interpersonal trust is a significant factor in effective communication. 
Careful investigation seems warranted. Possible applications of such 
research appear to be numerous and important: communication between 
students and the instructor in educational training situations; com.~uni-
cation in task groups in the armed forc,es and in industry; and commur.i-
cation in many diadic situations, such as doctor and patient, student 
and counsellor, parent and child. 
The Problem 
Before sophisticated, orderly scientific research can 
effectively be attempted, especially in a relatively unexplored area of 
study, two pTelirninary steps must be taken. First, the problem area 
must be clearly defined. The theories and conceptualizations, as well 
as the research procedures and experimental findings, of others must be 
collected and evaluated. Second, a working theory, complete with 
testable hypotheses, should evolve from the careful examination of 
previous research efforts. 
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Robert T. Golembiewski (1962) mentions the existence of 
these preliminary problems in his text The Small Group: 
It is necessary to isolate the dimensions of reality 
required to understand the relations which exist in 
the world. This is the process of conceptualization. 
In addition, it is necessary to develop ways of 
measuring the particular aspects of nature which are 
important to observe. This is the proces~ of opera-
tionalization. (p. 5) 
After both conceptualization and operationalization have taken place, 
the scientist can begin the actual observation of the behaviors in 
which he is interested. 
This research endeavor attempts to complete these two 
preliminary steps in the problem area of interpersonal trust as it 
relates to communication behavior. Thus, this is not an experimental 
investigation of the role of interpersonal trust may play in the 
communication of small task groups. Instead, it is an attempt to 
conceptualize and operationalize the role of interpersonal trust in the 
communication behavior of such groups. After this essential first work 
has been completed, the job of testing hypotheses with controlled 
observation should begin. 
The problem involved in this research project is summarized 
in the following questions: 
(1) What is the most reasonable hypothetical explanation 
of th~ functioning of interpersonal trust and its 
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effect upon the communication behaviors of members in 
small task-oriented groups? 
(2) How can the scholar best test this theory through 
reliable and valid measurement? 
Definitions 
The problem in this study involves a theoretical treatment 
of the role of interpersonal trust in the communication behaviors of the 
small task-oriented group. For purposes of clarification, the following 
terms will be defined and discussed: trust, interpersonal trust, 
communication, and the small task-oriented group. 
Trust 
The term "trust" has been prominent in our vocabulary for 
years. However, the concept of trust is somewhat similar to Mark Twain's 
notion of the weather: everybody knows about it, but few people have 
studied it. 
Trust has traditionally been thought of as a mystical and 
intangible factor, defying careful definition. Dictionary definitions 
describe the phenomenon in abstract terms such as: "confidence," 
"reliance," "expectation," and "hope." The American College Dictionary 
(1958) provides the following definition: "Reliance on the integrity, 
justice, etc. of a person, or on some quality or attribute of a thing: 
confidence." Webster's New World Dictionary (The World Publishing 
Company, 1960) speaks of the term as "firm belief or confidence in the 
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honesty, integrity, reliability~ etc. of another person or thing." 
Until recently, the discussion of trust and the recognition of its 
existence, has been the extent of scientific interest in the concept. 
Few efforts have been made to investigate the question of how it operates. 
In his pioneering research on trust and suspicion, Morton 
Deutsch (1958) noted the importance of trust to an understanding of 
social life and personality development and indicated his view of the 
current state of research on trust: 
Yet an examination of a half-dozen or more of the 
leading social psychology texts (e.g., texts by 
Cartwright and Zander, Homans, Krech and Crutch-
field, Lewin, Lindsey, Newcomb) reveals that the 
word "trust" does not appear in any of their indexes. 
So far as we know, the research summarized in this 
paper ~epresents the first attempt to investigate 
experimentally the phenomenon of trust. (p. 265) 
Deutsch struggled with the problem of defining trust. He noted (1958) 
that it involved more than predictability, although expectation was 
involved. He also noted that risk or "motivational relevance" (something 
invested) was requisite, and "when trust is not fulfilled, the trusting 
individual will suffer an unpleasant consequence." (p. 265) Deutsch 
defined trust in such a way that it captured some of the everyday usage 
connotations and also permitted experimental research: 
An individual may be said to have trust in the 
occurrence of an event if he expects its occurrence 
and his expectations lead to behavior he perceives 
to have greater negative motivational consequences 
if the expectations are not confirmed than positive 
motivational consequences if they are confirmed. (p. 266) 
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To describe the behavior of a trusting p:i:e~son it appears to 
me that the following elements are essential: 
(1) A person is relying upon something;, 
(2) This something relied upon may be a:rn roibject, an event, 
or a person, including the trusting, ]lXeTson himself; 
(3) Something is risked by the trustin& ]_D'eYson; 
(4) The trusting person hopes to acniev;e; ~-<:'.me goal by 
taking the risk; 
(5) The desired goal is hoped for, but n@tt.. ,perceived as 
certain; 
(6) The trusting person has at least w®J.ry small amount 
of confidence in the object of his ttmm.st. 
In view of these seemingly essential ele.m-e,nts, this writer 
has adopted the following formal definition of trust,: reli":nce upon 
the characteristics of a~ obJect, the occurrence of am ,event, or the 
behavior of..§:._ person to achieve.§:. desired but uncertarli..an. ,objective in a 
situation involving risk. 
Inherent in this definition of trust is; i.tl"h.e concept of degrees 
of confidence in the trusted person or object. Zer@ ©onfidence, i.e., 
blind faith in a totally unknown source of help, oo~ mot seem to me to 
be trust, although blind faith in "lady luck" might 1w.e11l- be the essential 
element of gambling. For this writer, the concept ~if ~Tust implies at 
least some small degree of confidence in the obJec-t ®ff the trust. 
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This concept of trust also implies at least a minimal degree 
of risk to the trusting person. This risk may be very small indeed--
perhaps only the possibility of a small loss of prestige, or maybe 
nothing more than a small amount of wasted time or energy. However, no 
matter how small, there is inherent in the concept of-trust, as I visualize 
it, at least some element of risk. 
In his analysis of the cow.munication process, Newcomb (1953) 
describes the relationship between a person and the object or concept 
about which he is communicating as an "orientation." He defines 
"orientation" (pp. 149-50) as, ". equivalent to "attitude" in its 
more inclusive sense of referring to both cathectic and cognitiye 
tendencies." In our conceptualization of trust the relationship between 
a trusting person and the object of his trust is viewed similarly as an 
"orientation," and thus as an "attitude" in this broad meaning of the 
term. 
Both cathectic and cognitive behavior seem to be involved 
in the phenomenon of interpersonal trust. In their summary of experimental 
studies of group problem solving and group processes, Kelley and Thibaut 
(1954) imply this conclusion: 
In certain instances, the initiator (communicator) 
may be viewed instrumentally as a "mediator of fact" 
by virtue of his perceived expertness, credibility 
and trustworthiness. In other instances, the recipient 
may be motivated to agree with the initiator without 
regard for his "correctness"; agreement may become 
an independent motive. The strength of this motive 
seems to depend partly on the strength of positive 
attachment to and affection for the initiator. (p. 743) 
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This conclusion is reminiscent of Cecil Gibb's (1950) finding that 
something of value one individual has in the eyes of another, is 
already evident at the stage of a first impression. This impression is 
measurable, and its relationship to an enduring interpersonal attitude 
can be determined, even though the individual cannot easily account for 
the impression received. 
An operational definition of trust is essential if we are 
to study it in a scientific manner; it must be defined in such a way 
that it can be measured. One must recognize, however, that trust, in 
part, is something inside a person's head. It may someday be measured 
directly by a neurologist or a biochemist, but since that is presently 
impossible, and indirect method of measurement is necessaiy. To 
measure trust we have to look elsewhere; we must look at what a person 
says or does. 
We can ask a person if he trusts another person: we can do 
so in a rather sophisticated way--with a Likert scale or a semantic 
differential. The use of the semantic differential has been explored 
by Berlo (1961), Anderse-n (1961), Lemert (1963), and Markham (1965) to 
measure source credibility of public speakers. Two Kansas University 
graduate students, in conjunction with Dr. Kim Giffin, have investigated 
the use of a semantic differential and a Likert scale for measuring 
interpersonal trust in small task-oriented groups. 
A second approach to the measurement of interpersonal 
trust involves the creation of a situation with two alternatives: one 
of the alternatives provides a possibility of achieving a desired 
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objective if a certain risk is run: the other alternative provides no 
risk and no possibility of gain. A person can then be allowed to make 
a choice between these two alternatives. When a person makes the 
"trusting choice" we can infer that he is actually trusting the other 
individual in that specific situation. This approach was explored by 
Deutsch (1958) and his students, Loomis (1958) and Solomon (1960). 
Recently the same approach has been made by Rapoport (1962b) and also 
by Roby and Carterette (1965). 
By varying the degree of risk involved in "trusting choice" 
situations, we can infer comparative degrees of trust "in the mind of" 
the trusting person. Of course, such inferences must be made with care, 
for what may appear to be a "trusting choice", in fact, may be made from 
other motivations such as impulse, caprice, imitation, conformity, 
habit, ignorance, virtue, fait~masochism, or despair. 
Communication 
At this point, a definition of "communication" is in order. 
The definition advanced by Warren Weaver (1949) is central to our use 
of the term: "· •. used here in a very broad sense to include all of 
the procedures by which one's mind may affect another." (p. 95) The 
emphasis made by Colin Cherry (1957) is also in line with our usage: 
"· •• communication ... is essentially the relationship set up by 
the transmission of stimuli and the evocation or responses." (p. 7) 
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In this study the term is used to mean the ora~-aural-visual 
exchange of messages, including meaning conveyed by verbal and non-verbal 
symbols. Communication involves the entire individual as he talks, 
writes, reads or listens. It includes his social environment and the 
ways in which he relates to it through sending and receiving messages. 
It includes motivations, perceptions, cognitions and personalities of 
both message senders and receivers as they exchange ideas, along with 
the changes in both persons which are produced. 
The student of the communication process asks this question: 
what kind of person says what to whom, for what purpose, in what way, 
under what conditions, with what effects? A rather complete theoretical 
treatment of these factors is given by David Berlo (1960) in his book, 
The Process of Communication. 
The Small Group 
The history of the study of "groups" could be written in 
terms of a series of concepts: society, primary group, reference group, 
membership group, and small group--from a higher-to-lower level of 
abstraction. As this process was occurring Newcomb (1951) noted: "The 
term 'group' . has achieved no standard meaning " (pp. 37-38) 
An acceptable definition of the term group is not easy; that of small 
group is more difficult. 
The concept of boundary became crucial in the definition of 
"a group" .. "Membership" became the criterion of boundary. Thus, the 
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boundary was defined frequently in an obvious, sometimes elegant, 
tautology. In discussing this problem Golembiewski (1962) concluded: 
"The point is simply that the empirical determination of such "boundaries" 
and "membership roles" for different types of collectivities has been 
almost untouched." (p. 35) 
There are three wide)y used definitions of small group. A 
large number of experimental or laboratory studies employ the definition 
developed by Robert F. Bales (1950): "a group is any number of persons 
engaged in a single face-to-face meeting or series of meetings in which 
each member receives some impression of each other member .... as an 
individual person, even though it be only to recall that the other was 
present." (p. 33) This definition seems to imply a limited number of 
persons but says little about their behavior. Thus it was rejected for 
use in this study. 
The second definition, frequently used by researchers who 
work with natural "real life" groups, implies almost any collection of 
people. This usage neither specifies size nor behavior. For example, 
a study by Venable (1954) dealt with "a relatively stable group" of 
college students. This group consisted of forty-two girls taking the 
same academic course. George Homans (1950) not only used the term 
"group" to refer to a primitive tribe, a street gang, a roomful of 
factory workers, and a New England village, but produced inferences 
from the study of these "groups" in combination. Such a treatment seems 
to imply that "a group is a group," regardless of size o-r interpersonal 
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relationships. The studies using this loose definition frequently are 
very valuable, They typically deal with "real" (not laboratory-created) , 
data. But research results obtained in studies using this definition 
must be carefully handled when comparisons are made with results from 
studies of other "groups." 
The most common working definition of a small group today 
involves two factors (Golembiewski, 1962): (l) a small number of 
individuals in interdependent role relations' who (2) have .§:. set of values 
(norms) which regulate behavior of members in matters of concern to the 
group. (pp. 35-36) This definition relates to the size of the group 
and to the individual's behavior as it affects the behavior of the other -- -- -- ------ ---- - - ---- ---- - --- ---
individuals in the group. This definition seems,_ to me, to most clearly 
distinguish small groups from other forms of social organization. For 
this reason, it is accepted as the designation of a "swall group" in 
this study. Neither of the other two common usages consider size or 
individual behavior within the group adequately. 
A small group may exist for many reasons. It could be for 
the performance of some task. Thus, the definition of a "task-oriented" 
small group is: a small group having a specific problem or job to 
perform. This task is the primary goal of the group and the members 
are "oriented" toward completing their defined job. 
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Previous Research 
It should be noted that previous research related to the 
problem area is not reviewed here. The synthesis and evaluation of 
the prior studies is a major part of this research effort, and these 
works are a part of the process of building a comprehensive theory of 
interpersonal trust in small task-oriented groups. For this reason, 
the previous research is considered in Chapter III. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF BEHAVIORAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
The ultimate aim of all natural science is explanation and 
understanding. (Marx, 1951, p. 5) The psychologist is interested in 
understanding general human behavior; the student of speech communication 
is concerned with understanding human communication behavior. Benton J. 
Underwood (1957) contends that this is the primary goal of science: 
The purpose of the methods of science is to achieve 
a description and understanding of nature (the universe). 
By understanding I mean the reduction to the smallest 
possible number of general laws which would account 
for the various specific facts. The descriptive part 
of science is concerned with research per se; what I 
have called understanding is usually achieved through 
theory. (p. 1) 
Some scholars assume that science's maJor objectjve is 
prediction and control. Marx (1951, p. 5) contends that this 
assumption is unfounded. The inability to predict or control events 
does not prevent important scientific understanding of these events. 
For example, Brown (Marx, 1951, p. 5) indicates that the inability to 
predict or control earthquakes has not prevented the scientific 
development of seismology. He further contends that the same situation 
exists in the area of human behavior. Causes are often too obscure, 
intricate, or inaccessible for exact prediction. Nevertheless, these 
phenomena can be investigated and understood, at least in part. Hence 
understanding, which is embodied in theory, is the ultimate aim of all 
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scientific theory. This principle applies to theory in the behavioral 
sciences as well as to theory in the natural sciences. 
The Assumptions of Science 
There are two basic assumptions that all scientists make 
when they adopt the philosophy that theory, or explanation and under-
standing, is their ultimate goal. The first assumption is that there is 
lawfulness in the events of nature as opposed to capricious, chaotic, or 
spontaneous occurrences. Every phenomenon is assumed to have a cause, 
and if that causal situation could be exactly reinstituted, the event 
would be duplicated. (Underwood, 1957, pp. 3-6) 
The second general assumption made by the scientist is that 
every natural event has a discoverable and limited number of conditions 
or factors which are responsible for it. Science would be an almost 
hopeless undertaking if nature were so constituted that everything in it 
influenced everything else. (Underwood, 1957, pp. 3-6) All scientific 
theory is premised on these two assumptions. 
Theory in Speech 
We can approximate an understanding of speech by examining 
the elaboration o,f concepts or theories about the field. Because the 
boundaries of speech are unclear and the field of speech encompasses a 
large variety of activity, there are many types of theories in the speech 
discipline. This situation tends to make the idea of theory in speech 
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unclear. Bormann (1965) vividly points to this situation in his book 
Theory and Research in the Communicative Arts: 
Speech is, in some respects, a clinical practice 
like medicine or psychiatry, a humanity like 
history or the classics; or a fine art like music, 
literature or painting. 
In the sciences theory means one thing, in fine 
arts it means something quite different ..•• 
The first step toward knowledge about speech is 
to understand the difference in various ways of 
stru~turing information and concepts. (p. 96) 
Like theory in other behavioral sciences, theory in speech 
communication focuses on human behavior. Psychology or social psychology 
experimentally investigate questions of general human behavior, but may 
focus on specific behaviors. In speech communication, we are interested 
in the speech event. Perhaps our point of view i5 different or more 
specific than that of other behavioral disciplines, but our investigatory 
methods are the same. Using Bormann's classificaLion we would conclude 
that a theory of the role of interpersonal trust in small group 
communication behavior would be similar to theories found in other 
behavioral disciplines, such as psychology or social psychology. 
(Bormann, 1965, p. 104) 
Characteristics of Behavioral Theories 
A general description of the characteristics of behavioral 
theories may help the reader understand the specific techniques employed 
in construction of this theory of interpersonal trust. If any theory is 
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to be an effective explanitory system, it must have the following 
general elements: functional relationships, hypothetical constructs, 
usefulness, bias, and comparability. The following paragraphs will 
review each of these in turn. 
Functional Relationships 
Marx (1951, p. 6) indicates that since theory must aim at 
explanation, functional relationships between variables must be 
established in a theory. These relationships are descriptive statements 
or propositions at varying levels of abstraction and comprehensiveness. 
In order to meet this requirement, the theory of interpersonal trust 
must explain the occurrence of trust between individuals by describjng 
the relevant variables which lead to trust formation. The relationships 
which exist between these variables must also be established. 
Hypothetical Constructs 
In part, the functional relationships found in behavioral 
theories are established through empirical measurement. An impressive 
array of highly reliable and useful scientific knowledge has been 
accumulated through direct empirical measurement. However, it is not 
always possible to answer scientific questions simply by means of direct 
observation and measurement. Many phenomena are too remotely and too 
tenuously related to the immediately observable variables to permit so 
direct an approach. Marx (1951, p. 4) contends that for this reason, 
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"modern natural sciences have developed a large number of theories 
which are ultimately based upon but which are not entirely reducible 
to bare empirjcal measurements." Thus, theory in the behavioral sciences 
consists of guesses as to how the uncontrolled or unknown factors in a 
system are related to experimentally known variables. (Bormann, 1965, p. 102) 
Spence (1944) illu5trates this characteristic of behavioral 
science theory by noting the basic differences between theory in the 
physical and behavioral sciences: 
In some areas, theories serve primarily to bring 
into functional connection with one another 
empirical laws which prior to their formulation 
had been isolated realms of knowledge. An example 
of such an area would be physics. 
In behavior sciences, variables in a simple 
experiment are so numerous that their empirical 
relationships cannot be ascertained. Theories 
are brought into play to aid in the formulation 
of laws. They consist primarily in the intro-
duction or postulation of ~ypothetical constructs 
which help to bridge gaps between experimental 
variables. (p. 48) 
The functional relationships which are derived through 
experimentation are often called empirical constructs. Those relation-
ships resulting from the intuitive guesses of the theorist are called 
hypothetical constructs. (Bormann, 1965, pp. 102-103) The theory of 
interpersonal trust contains these hypothetical constructs. 
Usefulness 
Theories can also be characterized by their use, since they 
are employed as both tools and objectives which have been reached. When 
used as a tool, a theory points to new avenues of research and helps 
generate new hypotheses. In this way theories are regarded as 
provisional explanations, the value of which may be determined by 
empirical investigation. (Marx, 1951, p. 6) 
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Often a theory is widely accepted as a valid ~xplanation. 
It is then regarded as an objective which has been reached. (Marx, 1951, p. 6) 
These reached objectives or accepted theories are employed to interpret 
or evaluate other theories or facts. 
Since the study of trust is in its infancy, we would expect 
any theory about this phenomenon to function primarily as a tool. The 
theory embodied in this study should be regarded first as a tentative 
description and explanation which provides guidelines for future 
experimental investigation. If future research verifies the truth of 
this explanation, the theory of trust would then function as a reached 
objective. 
Bias 
All theories are relative to bias. The first source of 
theoretical bias comes from the theorist when he interprets and evaluates 
previous research and when he establishes hypothetical constructs in 
those areas where experimental evidence does not describe important 
relationships. The bias of the various observers upon whose empirical 
reports the theorist has depended provides the second major source of bias. 
Some bias is inevitable in all theory. An awareness of the existence of 
this theoretical bias, particularly on the part of the theorist, can help 
reduce it to a minimum. (Marx, 1951, pp. 6-7) 
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Comparability 
Alternative theoretical approaches can be directly compared 
scientifically only if they make different predictions within the same 
observational framework. (Marx, 1951, p. 7) For example, when compared 
to Deutsch's theory of interpersonal trust, the theory in this study uses 
the same measuring techniques, but makes different predictions, a scientific 
comparison of the two theories could be made. However, if different 
observational frameworks are used, such a comparison w0uld be impossible. 
Methodology 
The remaining chapters of this study develop a theory of 
interpersonal trust in small group communication. The specific method 
used in construction of the theory is outlined below. 
How does one develop a theory? There appears to be two 
basic approaches to theory construction. In the first approach, theory 
is developed through the planning and carrying out of coordinated 
systematic research. The Yale Communication Research Program provides 
an example of this approach. (Selltiz, et~-, 1961, p. 494) 
The second approach to theory construction builds theory on 
the basis of existing studies. For instance, the theory of reference 
group behavior by Merton and Rossi (1957), uses as its material numerous 
researches in the American Soldier. (Stouffer, et~-, 1949) This 
approach aims at development of three types of verbal statements or 
propositions. (Marx, 1951, p. 7) The propositions and the steps used 
in arriving at them are outlined below. 
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Empirical Propositions 
Empirical statements are propositions of "fact" of what has 
been observed. (Marx, 1951, p. 7) The theorist examines these propositions 
found in previous studies in order to understand and conceptualize the 
phenomenon in which he is interested. 
All known, available scientific studies relating directly to 
interpersonal trust were collected and reviewed in an attempt to understand 
what is already known about trust. Other studies, not directly concerned 
with trust, were also considered when it appeared to the writer that 
the concepts with which they deal seem to be related to the problem 
under consideration. Such an examination of related research can be 
fruitful to the theorist. For example, fhe American Soldier studies 
were not planned in terms of the Merton and Rossi concept of a reference-
group, yet these scholars interpreted a number of the studies that 
were concerned with morale and satisfaction in these terms. (Selltiz, 
et~-, 1961, p. 493) Hence, the theory of trust is grounded in a 
consideration of the evidence pertaining directly to interpersonal trust 
and to factual data in such related areas as source credibility, 
hostility and aggression, stagefright, and psychoanalysis. All of the 
existing studies upon which the present research is based are on file at 
the Communication Research Center at the University of Kansas. 
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Theoretical Propositions 
Theoretical propositions are more or less general statements 
of varying degrees of abstractness and comprehensiveness concerning 
functional relations among variables. (Marx, 1951, p. 7) How does 
the theorist arrive at theoretical propositions? Many of the variables 
and their relations with other variables are already known. These are 
found in the previous studies. When examining these pieces of research, 
the theorist becomes aware of their existence. This, then, is the 
theorist's first source of theoretical propositions. 
However, frequently either the experimental data is 
conflicting or there is no evidence concerning potential variables and 
their possible relations to known variables. In these cases the facts 
are not known. Thus, the theorist guesses as to the unknown variables 
that relate to empirical data in such a way as to make the results 
meaningful. (Bormann, 1965, pp. 116-117) 
The theorist's guesses can be educated ones. At times the 
theorist not only can rely on his own reasoning, but also can detect 
relations between variables in some of the studies he reads. Although 
these studies may not provide factual evidence regarding unknown 
variables, by inference they can point to plausible variables and the 
relations between them. 
Some of the theorist's best sources of non-factual 
information are the normative theories of others. A normative theory, 
which explains how things ought to be rather than how things probably are, 
as in scientific theory, can point to possible unknown variables. By 
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examining these theories, the theorist benefits from the armchair 
speculations of others who may have great insight into the problem. 
Many such theorists have concerned themselves with the phenomenon of 
trust. Therefore, it seemed appropriate for this writer to consult 
the works of the classical rhetoricians and the contemporary rhetorical 
scholars. Some of the variables included in the theory of trust have 
been suggested by these writers. Credit is given to these scholars each 
time such a variable is included in the theory. 
Hypothetical Statements 
Hypothetical propositions are statements of supposition or 
conjecture of what is predicted in observation. (Marx, 1951, p. 7) This 
type of verbal proposition forms the link between empirical propositions 
and theories. The implications of a theory. can be tested only by means 
of specific predictions or experimental hypotheses. Without hypotheses, 
confirmation or rejection of theories would be impossible. Chapter IV 
contains a list of specific hypotheses developed for the testing of the 
theory of interpersonal trust. These hypothetical propositions deal 
with the variables outlined in the theory. The listing is not meant to 
be comprehensive. Instead, it is included to provide guidelines for 
future experimentation. Many of the variables and relationships between 
them, which are outlined in the theory, are not considered in this list 
of hypothetical statements. Other researchers can formulate the 
hypotheses necessary to the testing of these parts of the theory. 
However, the ~ypotheses included are ones that can now be tested. 
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Furthermore, it is believed that our knowledge of interpersonal trust 
and its role in the communication behavior of small groups will accumulate 
faster if the included hypotheses are tested before other or less 
significant hypotheses are considered. 
Theory Evaluation 
How does one evaluate the worth of a theory? One way of 
determining a theory's validity is to discover through experimentation 
how well it explains the phenomenon it purports to explain. Since this 
is the only scientific method of theory validation, it takes time. Until 
such experimentation occurs, the reader can rely on other methods of 
evaluation. One such method is suggested by Leon Festinger in his 
theory of social comparison process. (1954, p. 163) With this method, 
behaviorial theories are frequently viewed in terms of how 11plausible11 
they seem. Plausibility usually means whether or not the theory fits 
one's intuition or common sense. Everett E. Hagen, author of On~ Theory 
of Social Change (1962) offers the same suggestion: 
A theory ... is to be accepted not in some 
absolute sense but only because it seems to 
provide a more comprehensive, accurate, and 
logically simple explanation of the facts of 
life than an alternative theory. (p. 19) 
It is hoped that those who read this study will apply the above criterion 
in evaluating the theory of interpersonal trust. 
Behavioral theories that do not seem plausible to other 
behavioral scientists are usually never tested. One distinct 
characteristic of poor theories is that they never seem to be used. 
Michael Polanyi (1958) makes this evident in his book Personal Knowledge: 
••• a scientist must commit himself in respect to 
any important claim put forward within his field of 
knowledge. If he ignores the claim he does in fact 
imply that he believes it to be unfounded. If he 
takes notice of it, the time and attention which he 
diverts to its examination and the extent to which 
he takes account of it in guiding his own investi-
gations are a measure of the likelihood he ascribes 
to its validity. Only if a claim lies totally 
outside his range of responsible interests' can the 
scientist assume an attitude of completely impartial 
doubt towards it. He can be strictly agnostic only 
on subjects of which he knows little and cares 
nothing. (p. 276) 
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It is suggested that the reader ask two specific questions 
in determining the plausibility of the theory of trust. First, do the 
outcomes the theory would lead one to expect coincide closely with 
outcomes so far observed? Second, do the component elements of the theory 
coincide closely with principles that have been verified independently? 
If the answer to both questions is "yes," one may hope that the theory 
will also predict future outcomes. (Hagen, 1962, p. 19) 
Summary 
In surnmar~, the ultimate aim of natural science is understanding. 
This understanding is achieved through the explanation found in theory. 
Speech communication theory is similar to theory in other behavioral 
sciences. 
Our theory of interpersonal trust will try to explain the 
phenomenon of trust by establishing functional relationships between 
variables. It makes use of hypothetical constructs and should be regarded 
as a provisional explanation. Of necessity the theory will contain bias. 
And, as an explanatory system, it can be compared to other theories only 
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under certain, specific circumstances. 
The theory of trust is pased on an examination of existing 
studies, related both directly and indirectly to the phenomenon of trust. 
It aims at establishing empirical, theoretical, and hypothetical 
propositions by examining the facts, guessing the unknown variables and 
their relations with known variables, and constructing specific, testable 
statements that link the theoretical to the factual propositions. 
CHAPTER III 
A THEORY OF INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN SMALL GROUP COMMUNICATION 
Our conceptualization attempts to explain the existence of 
trust in small group communication behavior by asking two basic questions. 
The first question this writer is asking is: why do individuals tend 
to trust or djstrust each other? 
Interpersonal trust can be viewed as a dependent variable. 
The theory outlined in this paper attempts to view trust in this context. 
By doing so, another important question is posed: what are the communi-
cation factors which influence interpersonal trust and distrust, and 
how are these factors related? 
It is hoped that both of these questions are answered in the 
following pages of this study. When each is answered, the theory will 
be complete. 
The Basis of Interpersonal Trust 
It is essential that we distinguish between trusting 
behaviors and attitudes of trust. Trusting behavior is explained in 
our formal definition of trust: reliance upon the behavior of another 
person to help achieve a desired but uncertain objective in a situation 
involving risk. Trusting behavior requires the actual reliance upon 
another's behavior. 
An attitude of trust is ,a predisposition to rely on the 
behavior of another person in any risky situation in order to achieve a 
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desired but uncertain objective. As was indicated earlier, attitude is 
here considered broadly. This view of attitude involves both cognitive 
and cathectic (emotional) behaviors. 
We would assume that a trusting attitude would precede 
trusting behavior in a rational organism. This assumption is incorporated 
in the present theory. Our first question is partially answered: men 
trust and distrust each other because they are predisposed to do so. 
Although the above reasoning accounts for the existence of 
trust and distrust in human behavior, it does not explain why or how 
such attitudes are formed. 
The Need-Satisfaction-Frustration Model 
There are many theoretical explanations as to why and how 
people generally form various interpersonal and self-evaluations. 
Although all the theories of attitude formation and change are not 
reviewed here, it is important to note that the theory of interpersonal 
trust supports two types of major theoretical constructs which are often' 
employed to explain the development of interpersonal attitudes. The 
major elements of these two models and their applicability to our theory 
arc outlined. 
The first basic approach is commonly called the need-
satisfaction and need-frustration model. This type of explanation is 
the prevailing conceptual approach in the investigation of human 
attraction and hostility. (Pepitone, 1964, p. 222) According to this 
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theory, the attractiveness of another person is a function ,of the need-
satisfaction which that person brings about. Hostility toward another 
person occurs when an individual imposes need-fl"listration. The 
attractiveness of the self is also interpreted in terms of this model. 
For example, if the self is a source of need-satisfaction, it is liked. 
With this concept the attraction of a group for its members (group 
cohesiveness) is a function of the need-satisfaction which the group is 
able to bring about. (Pepitone, 1964, p. 222) 
In order to predict changes in attraction and hostility in 
a given situation, one must know which needs are operating and which 
behaviors and conditions satisfy or frustrate these needs. Attempts 
to test the need-satisfaction-frustration model have been made using 
status and security motives as possib]e determinants of attraction and 
hostility. The reasoning behind this experimentation is: the greater 
the reduction in the threat of status (or security) loss which another 
person brings about, the more attractive this person becomes to the 
individual. Hostile attitudes toward another person are based upon how 
much he threatens the individual with the loss of status (or security). 
Substantial experimentation has provided a wealth of evidence to support 
these theories of attraction and hostility. (Pepitone, 1964, pp. 6-25) 
If the need-satisfaction-frustration model correctly explains 
how man evaluates himself and others, it could probably be used as an 
explanation of how attitudes of trust and distrust are formed. We could 
then assume that the attitude of trust an individual has toward another 
person is a function of the need-satisfaction which that person is 
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thought to be able to bring about. Attitudes of distrust toward another 
person occur when that person is perceived as capable of producing and 
likely to impose need frustration. In order to predict changes in 
attitudes of trust or distrust with this model we would need to know 
which needs are operating and which behaviors and conditions satisfy or 
frustrate these needs. 
The attitudes of trust and distrust are indeed grounded in 
the perceived likelihood that others will either satisfy or frustrate 
basic needs_is one of Erikson's (1950) major theoretical hypotheses. 
Erikson labels the first of his eight stages of man as "Trust and Basic 
Distrust." He suggests that the central psychosocial problem in the 
period of baby hood is to what degree the baby acquires a sense of 
mistrust. Erikson suggests that this sense is acquired in the following 
way. 
At times the baby has to feel a need more intensly than at 
others in order for its satisfaction to occur, and at times he has to 
cry out. He learns in greater or lesser degree that the connection 
between his initiative and satisfactory response to it is not automatic 
or certain. But the degree to which this is true varies greatly for 
different children, and from the degree the infant learns an important 
lesson. He either typically faces a problem (for example, hunger), 
attacks it (stirs or cries out), and solves it (nourishment appears 
within a reasonable period of time), or he faces it and lies in pain and 
anxiety during a period of tim~ in which he fails to find a solution. 
(Perhaps his mother is too busy to feed him or thinks that waiting will 
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teach him good habits.) Either he can depend on his initiative, the 
response being safe, dependable, comforting; or he cannot, and gains a 
sense that initiative is not followed by dependable response. 
That the baby shall come to trust his ability to obtain a 
satisfactory response from the world requires not merely that his 
physiological needs shall be met dependably but also that their relief 
shall be accomplished in a manner that is comforting, reassuring, and 
loving" From his mother's confident, smooth movements, caressing touches, 
relaxed muscles, and easy and caressing voice he gains a feeling that 
the world is a secure place. Insofar as he is fussed over needlessly 
by an anxious mother, or handled abruptly by an impatient or irritated 
mother, or handled by a mother whose main interest at the time is else-
where--in a conversation she is carrying on or her complexion--he learns 
that the world does not respond to him, even though his physiological 
care is adequate. If he is to trust, he must gain the perception that 
his environment, at this s_tage almost wholly his mother, is trustworthy. 
The infant's first social achievement is his willingness to 
allow his mother out of his sight without undue anxiety or rage. The 
mother has become an inner certainty as well as an outer consistency. 
1!_ is from the outer consistency that the infant builds his feelings of 
trust in others. He trusts that his mother will return and meet his 
needs. This inner sense of trust also includes that one is trustworthy 
enough to be worthy of consistent and trustworthy behaviors on the part 
of others. 
For no baby are the responses of his environment to his urges 
entirely dependable. Even in the most favorable of environments a pin 
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will prick, colic will develop, a finger will be cut, and so on. 
Inevitably during the teething period every child will experience 
pain for which he sees no cause and will feel that the world is 
arbitrary and hostile. The cases of general happy trust in one's 
relationship to one's world and of pervading anxiety are extremes of 
a continuum. In Erikson's explanation, the infant gains a balance of 
trust and mistrust. 
The behaviors involved in the need-satisfaction-frustration 
model, and Erikson's interpretation of their babyhoou origins, have 
been adopted as a fundamental part of the theory of interpersonal trust. 
To this writer's knowledge, there is no experimental evidence supporting 
the preceeding highly abstract conceptualization. Hence, what is 
presented in the above paragraphs is speculative. Nevertheless, it is 
believed to be the most reasonable explanation of why humans by their 
very nature hold attitudes of trust and distrust. 
As our formal definition assumes, perceived elements of 
risk are essential in trusting situations. The need-satisfaction-
frustration model accounts for the uncertainty which occurs in human 
interaction. Because individual initiative is potentially incapable of 
leading to need satisfaction, as the model assumes, one is forced to 
frequently rely on others for such satisfactions. Through past experience 
the individual has learned that other people are undependable at times. 
Hence, when seeking dependable rewards, the person is motivated to discover 
those individuals most likely to provide such rewards. Then a risky 




Erikson's need-satisfaction-frustration model is capable of 
explaining the existence of varying general predispositions to trust or 
distrust others in individual and group behavior. Since the model 
explains the formation of interpersonal trust as a behavior learned in 
childhood, it is capable of demonstrating why some individuals tend to 
be more trusting in their interactions with others, and why other 
individuals generally -::end to distrust those people around them. To 
my knowledge, there is no experi~ental evidence regarding the existence 
of general predispositions to trust or distrust in normal individuals. 
However, it is suggested that these predispositions do exist. 
The mental disorder called paranoia is characterized by 
systemitized delusions, especially delusion~ concerning persecution. 
The paranoid often distrusts most people around him. His general level 
of distrust is so great that he may be incapable of normal societal 
activity. It is not here implied that the causes of paranoia are the 
same as the causes of trust and distrust in the normal individual. 
However, it is suggested that the existence of a high degree of 
suspicion in paranoia is analogous to the existence of general tendencies 
of varying degrees to trust or to distrust others in normal persons. 
Common sense reasoning adds strength to the above logic. 
Most of us know individuals who, because of their great tendencies to 
trust others, are often taken advantage of by those with whom they 
associate. On the other hand, we also know people who generally tend 
to distrust and suspect most of the individuals they know. Of course 
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these two types are extremes on a continuum. 
Giffin's (1966c) theoretical work on stagefright and 
intrapersonal trust indicates that some individuals (those suffering 
from stagefright) generally tend not to trust themselves, and as a result 
do not trust their listeners in communication situations. Although 
Giffin's work on intrapersonal trust will not be reviewed here in detail, 
it does lend credibility to the suggestion that general predispositions 
to trust or to distrust, in fact, do exist. 
Cultural Predispositions 
If, as Erikson's explanation indicates, child-rearing 
techniques can cause the individual to gain a general balance of trust 
and mistrust (a general predisposition to trust or distrust others), it 
seems possible that different cultures, with their varying approaches to 
child care and rearing, could exhibit different amounts of trust and 
distrust in their interpersonal relationships. For example, Elton B. 
McNiel (1965), tells of a society with an unusually high degree of 
interpersonal distrqst, and traces this phenomenon to adult behavior 
during childhood years. He says: 
Among the Pueblo Indians, the Hopi are a society 
based on a notable maladjustment of its people; 
maladjustment in the sense of a state in which 
continued friction predominates in personal relations 
and in which the worst is regularly and anxiously 
anticipated. Gossip, witchcraft, fear, discord, and 
mutual distrust pervade the daily interactions of the 
tribal members. In part, the antagonistic attitudes 
of the adults can be traced to the sharp and consistent 
restriction of the overt expression of aggression by 
the child after an earlier period in which his aggressive-
ness was a successful and rewarding way of behaving. (p. 34) 
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The previous concept is incorporated into the present theory: cultures 
and societies exhibit varying general levels of trust and distrust in 
their interpersonal relationships. 
Summary 
Let us briefly summarize the theory of interpersonal trust 
as it has been developed thus far. It is suggested that: 
(1) The individual attempts to maximize the satisfaction 
and minimize the frustration of his needs. 
(2) This can often be accomplished only through the reliance 
upon others who are undependable at times. 
(3) Because of the inherent risk involved in satisfying his 
needs, the individual is motivated to evaluate the 
probability that other persons will be dependable sources 
of rewards; 
(4) Interpersonal attitudes of trust and distrust basically 
evolve from the individual's desire to reduce the risk 
involved in either satisfying his needs or preventing 
their frustration. 
(5) These behaviors are first learned during the period of 
childhood. 
(6) The individual has a predisposition of a certain degree 
to either trust or distrust others. 
(7) Cultures and societies can exhibit different degrees of 
trust and distrust in interpersonal relationships. 
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The Cognitive-Validation Model 
The second major conceptualization of attitude formation 
and change, adopted for use in the theory of interpersonal trust, is 
suggested by Albert Pepitone (1964). This model involves a purely 
cognitive explanation of interpersonal evaluation. Pepitone assumes the 
existence of a "validation" motive--a need of the individual to maintain 
a cognitive structure which correctly maps physical or social reality 
concerning the value of himself and others along some dimension. 
Pepitone's conceptualization indicates that whenever an 
estimate of an individual's own or another person's worth deviates from 
estimates of an objective valuation in a given respect, the individual 
will tend to change his cognitive structure so that such valuations are 
more in line with reality. Pepitone emphasizes that the cognitive-
validation construct has been highly useful in interpreting a large 
variety of social behaviors: 
Experiments on opinion conformity, conformity in 
making judgments about physical stimuli, persistence 
in setting of aspiration, formation of competitive 
coalitions, and affiliation preferences all yield 
data which can be interpreted in terms of a cognitive 
validation process. (p. 223) 
The following example indicates how the cognitive-validation-
motive theory could explain the existence of positive and negative 
interpersonal attitudes. When an individual interacts with a boastful 
person (a peTson whose estimate of his own worth exceeds a valid estimate 
as perceived by those around him), the individual may be expected to 
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develop a negative (hostile) attitude toward the boastful person. This 
change of attitude would occur through the validation tenden~y. In the 
above example, the individual validated his cognitions of the worth of 
the boastful person according to the opinions of those around that person. 
In this case, the dimension used for validation was majority opinion. 
Other scholars have also contended that such a validation 
process operates. For example, in a classic essay of modern times, 
Festinger (1950) set forth a theory of the need to validate one's under-
standing of reality (the world about us) by checking with other people. 
He identified a continuum on which he placed at one end "physical reality" 
and on the other end "social reality." Physical reality was said to 
involve such things as surfaces or objects, the perception of which an 
individual can validate with his physiological senses. Social reality 
was said to involve perceptions of such things as appropriate social 
Behavior, judgments of a moral or ethical nature, those eJements of 
"reality" which we usually associate with attitudes, opinions or beliefs. 
An opinion, attitude or belief was said to be perceived by the individual 
as valid to the extent it was anchored in (or reflected by) an approved 
reference group. For example, the validation of one's perception of 
himself as an "adequate communicator" would partly require feedback from 
other people. The less "physical" reality involved in an opinion or 
judgment, the greater the need of communication from a reference group. 
In a later paper Festinger (1954) further developed this theory. 
The idea of a need to validate one's perception of reality 
was not new with Festinger. Cooley (1909) and Mead (1934) had argued 
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the point. In fact, their approach has become a traditional viewpoint 
frequently employed to describe the basis of social psychology--the 
thesis that man's impressions of his mind, self, and consciousness 
emerges as internalizations of concepts evolved from social interaction. 
Thus man needs to communicate to verify his views of himself and his 
worild. 
It seems that we could also interpret the existence of 
positive and negative attitudes in the area of trust by using the same 
reasoning. We could say that an individual may form an attitude of 
distrust for another person because he sees that in potential future 
situations, as inferred by past or present situational and behavior-al 
criteria, that that person's behavior cannot be relied upon. 
However, it is suggested that dimensions other than 
reference group or majority opinion are also used by the individual to 
validate his cognitions regarding the trustworthiness of others. When 
faced with the decision to trust or distrust, the opinions of others are 
frequently unknown or impossible to determine in many social situations. 
Yet attitudes of trust and distrust are probably formed by the individuals 
involved in such situations. Other dimensions seem to be used ?Y the 
individuals involved in such situations, when validating their attitudes 
regarding the trustworthiness of others. These dimensions and the 
evidence regarding them are outlined in our consideration of the 
communication factors which influence interpersonal trust and distrust. 
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Our adaptation of Pepitone's cognitive-validation model 
suggests that trusting and distrusting attitudes occur when the individual 
validates his cognitions regarding reality according to some dimensjon in 
situations involving risk. 
The need-satisfaction-frustration model and the cognitive-
validation model are complimentary explanatory systems. Both explanations 
suggest that the individual is motivated to appraise other people. The 
need-satisfaction-frustration model emphasizes the reason for this tendency: 
to achieve need satisfaction and avoid need frustration. The cognitive-
validation-motive model focuses on the general pTocess involved in the 
formation of these interpersonal attitudes: the validation ~f cognitions 
regarding reality according to~ dimension. 
Attitudes of trust and distrust are arrived at through a 
process of cognitive validation is purely speculative. To the knowledge 
of this writer, no experimental evidence regarding the existence or 
influence of such a process exists in the area of interpersonal trust. 
Our integration of the cognitive-validation concept into the theory of 
interpersonal trust c~n be summarized in the following statement: 
(8) The individual, in his desire to satisfy his needs 
and prevent their frustration, tends to validate his 
cogn~tions regarding the trustworthiness of others 
according to certain dimensions. 
It is hoped that the previous parts of this theory will seem 
more logical and reasonable after the reader has considered the dimensions 
used by the individual in validating his cognitions regarding the value of 
himself and others. 
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The Dimensions of Interpersonal Trust in Communication 
The factors which directly influence interpersonal trust in 
small-group communication appear to be the listener's perception of 
these characteristics of the speaker: 
(1) Expertness relevant to the topic under discussion may 
be in the form of quantity of pertinent information, 
degree of ability or skill, or validity of judgment. 
(2) Reliability as an information source may be perceived 
as dependability; predictability, or consistency. 
(3) Intentions toward the trusting person may be perceived 
by him as favorable. 
(4) Activeness of the speaker or his communication behavior 
which appears to be more active than passive may be 
perceived by the listener. 
(5) Personal Attraction of the speaker for the listener, a 
dimension difficult to measure, possibly non-rational 
or non-cognitive, may be operating without conscious 
perception by the listener and without his knowledge of 
interaction with one or more of the four factors listed 
above. 
(6) Majority opinion of the others may be present regarding 
the degree of trust that should be placed in the 
communication of any one of the members of the immediate 
group or audience. 
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There are small amounts of supporting evidence in the 
literature concerning the relationships suggested between these factors 
and interpersonal trust, but not enough to be convincing. Hence, the 
relationships should be regarded at this time as pypothetical rather 
than certain. 
Studies of the Credibility, Ethos, or Image of a Communication Source 
Scholars investigating communicator image, source credibility, 
ethos, or prestige have considered the factor of intPrpersonal trust in 
the communication process. Numerous studies have shown that the quality 
of the communicator's image affects in one way or another the receiver's 
acceptance of a message. An excellent summary of these studies has been 
provided by Andersen and Clevenger (1963). Their summary of findings 
regarding the influence of ethos upon attitude change on the part of 
listeners may be abstracted as follows: (p. 77) 
(1) Despite the great number of experimental studies, the 
findings "are not yet sufficiently numerous and sophisti-
cated to permit definitive conclusions about the operation 
of ethical proof." 
(2) The finding.is almost universal that "the ethos of the 
source is related in some way to the impact of the message." 
This principle applies to political, social, religious, 
economic, and aesthetic issues. 
(3) The effect of ethos tends to have a temporal dimension, 
that is, "when the stimulus is not renewed, material 
presented by a high ethos source loses in persuasiveness 
and that given by a poor source gains." 
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(4) Auditors who are neutral initially in their attitude 
toward the topic of the speaker's purpose ''shift more 
often than do those who are at one extreme or the other." 
(5) Expert opinion" may be about as influential as majority 
opinion in inducing attitude change." 
(6) A congruity model "can be used to predict attitude change 
toward both a communicator and his topic." 
(7) Printed and oral propaganda "can succeed in creating and 
altering images of groups or of individuals, but attempts 
to produce unfavorable reactions to individuals may 
backfire." 
(8) Speeches of introduction "probably influence the image 
of a speaker, but most of the evidence on this point is 
indirect." 
'fhe studies of the factors which influence the degree of ethos 
a speaker may have for a given listener do not seem to lend themselves to 
such a clear-cut list of conclusions. The question is this: what are the 
dimensions of source credibility? In other words, what variables affect 
the image of~ speaker as it is perceived by~ listener? It is believed 
that an answer to this question will provide insight into the factors 
which influence interpersonal trust in small group communication. 
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle contended that ethos, the estimation 
of a speaker by a listener, is based upon the listener's perception of 
three characteristics of the speaker. These were: intelligence (correctness 
of opinions), character (honesty), and good will (a favorable attitude 
toward the hearer or audience). (Cooper, 1932, p. 92) 
43 
Hovland and his associates (1953) analyzed the factors 
leading to perceived credibility of the communicator under two headings: 
(1) the extent to which a communicator is perceived to 
be a source of valid assertions (expertness), and 
(2) the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent 
to communicate the assertions he considers most valid 
(trustworthiness) . (p. 21) 
Aristotle's factors of character and good will are apparently combined 
under the single concept of perceived intent to be a reliable communicator 
in Hovland's paradigm. 
Hovland and his associates (1953) suggested that certain 
characteristics of the speaker may influence the receiver's perception 
of the communicator's expertness and intentions. They contended (p. 22} 
that perceived expertness may be influenced by: (1) age, (2) position of 
leadership, and (3) similarity to the receiver regarding status, values, 
interests, and needs. They also suggested (pp. 23-25) that perceived 
intentions may be influenced by: (1) attempts to persuade others, leading 
to the inference that the speaker has something to gain (for example, 
advertising and sales "pitches" compared to newscasts), and (2) attempts 
to manipulate the listener, that is, attempts obviously designed to 
"persuade" him rather than simply to "inform" him. 
Several variables, studied singly or in very small combinations, 
have been shown to have an effect, in one way or another, upon a speaker's 
ethos or credibility. 
The effect of a series of newspaper editorials upon the image of 
an unknown !'>ource was studied by Annis and Meier (1934). As few as 
seven edjtorials generated the desired "image." 
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A study of the effect of a dramatic· allegory, "The Investigator," 
a severely satirical radio drama about Joseph McCarthy, brought surprising 
results reported by Berlo and Kumata (1956). The ethos of Senator McCarthy 
was more favorable, and attitudes toward the source bf the broadcast 
(The Canadian Broadcasting Company) became less favorable. Such a 
"boomerang" effect can result from an attempt to lower the ethos of 
an individual. 
The effect of an "introduction by a person presenting a speaker 
to an audience has been studied by Pross (1942) and by Kersten (1958) 
with unimpressive results. A later study by Andersen (1961) demonstrated 
that three introductions of'a speaker designed to establish varying levels 
of ethos provided speakers on "the farm problem" significantly different 
measures of ethos as perceived by student audiences; these differences 
were demonstrated on the evaluative and the dynamism dimensions of a 
semantic differential scale and also on a Likert.-type scale of 
authoritativeness. Similar results were reported by Mccroskey (1966) 
using Likert-type scales of authoritativeness and character (p. 68) and 
semantic differential scales (p. 69); the authoritativeness involved was 
related to "problems of education." King (1966) produced significant 
differences in audience judgments of ethos of the same speaker as reflected 
on both the evaluative and the dynamism dimensions of the semantic 
differential scales of ethos developed by Andersen (1961); King accomplished 
these results by using two different introductions for the same speaker, 
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one describing the speaker as a sophomore English major inexperienced 
with the subject area of the speech (teaching machines and programmed 
learning), and the other describing the speaker as Dr. Robert E. Rayburn, 
a professor at Princeton University, a pioneer in the development of 
teaching machines and learning programs, listed in Who's Who in America, 
well known for work in both education and experimental psychology, and 
the author of four books in psychology and programmed learning (fictitious 
titles were given). It appears from these studies that an introduction 
for a speaker can make d measurable difference in his ethos, but that the 
material employed must be extensive and impressive. 
Another variable presumed to affect ethos of a speaker is the 
use of cited authority in support of materials contained in a speech. 
Studies by Cole (1954), Gilkinson, Paulson and Sikkink (1954), and 
Sikkink (1956) reported that citation of authority did not increase 
persuasiveness. Cathcart (1955) found that: (1) arguments supported by 
authority without documentation, (2) use of authority with documentation, 
and (3) specification of the expertness of the authority all produced 
significantly greater_ shifts of opinion than did the same arguments 
presented without these forms of support. Cathcart also measured 
differences in perceived ethos of the speaker, but could find no significant 
differences in audience evaluation of the speaker's competence, enthusiasm, 
or clarity of ideas. Perhaps these forms of support influence the 
audience perception of an ethos dimension not measured by Cathcart, or 
perhaps the audience did not view these forms of support as related to 
the ethos of the speaker. A similar study by Ludlum (1956) prepared a 
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speech containing (1) acknowledgment of opposing arguments, (2) "leading 
thoughts rather than forcing," (3) a showing of alleged facts to be con-
sistent with known facts, (4) a showing of material to be recent, and (5) 
the use of a number of self-praising statements. Ludlum compared the 
persuasiveness of this speech with one employing "straight argumentative 
address," and found the latter more persuasive. He did not measure 
perceived ethos of the speaker in either case. 
In two related experiments McCroskey (1966) compared the 
effect of two different speeches on audience-perceived authoritativeness 
of the speaker as measured by Likert-type scale having excellent indices 
of reliability. One speech made extensive use of documented evidence 
and the other contained no documentation nor qualification of evidence-
sources. In the first experiment Mccroskey found significant differences 
in the audience perception of the authoritativeness of the speakers; in 
the second he found no significant differences. 
King (1966) produced rather impressive results by using the 
following techniques; he prepared two speeches as nearly alike as possible 
except for "ethos materials. 11 The first speech (high "ethos material") 
included phrases designed to show that the speaker was a man of intelligence, 
good character, and good will. References were made to the speaker's 
experience with the subject matter of the speech, giving exact details 
with accuracy and precision and using extensive technical language. 
Statements showing confidence in himself and modest self-pride were 
employed in an attempt to reveal the speaker's good character. Also 
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included were statements expressing interest in the well-being of the 
audience. The second speech (low "ethos material") included statements 
designed to show the speaker's lack of knowledge. It included statements 
which were vague and employed non-technical language. Other statements 
revealed that the speaker lacked confidence in himself. And still other 
statements indicated lack of respect for his audience. King found 
significant differences in audience response on both the evaluative 
and dynamism dimensions of the semantic differential scales of ethos 
developed by Anderson (1961). 
Several studies have shown that an audience's perception 
of the social status of a speaker influences their perception of the 
speaker's ethos. Haiman (1948) found that an audience rated graduate 
student speakers higher than undergraduates on (1) competence, (2) 
fairmindedness, (3) sincerity, and (4) likableness (actual speakers were 
different, but the text of the speech was the same, and other conditions 
were generally held constant). He also found shifts of opinion 
correlated positively with the competence ratings for the speakers but 
not correlated with ratings of the other three variables. An additional 
finding was that variations in ratings of likableness and physical 
attractiveness could be produced through changes in appearance and demeanor. 
A study by Harms (1959) showed that listeners in general 
assign high credibility to speakers perceived as having high social status, 
and that they tend to identify low status speakers more readily than high. 
These findings are consistent with earlier findings by Allport and Cantril 
(193) that personality, physical characteristics, and occupation are likely 
to be perceived correctly by hearing a person speak. 
48 
The findings cited above tend to support the theory that 
nonverbal and subliminal cues influence audience perceptions of ethos. 
However, other studies have failed to clarify this relationship. Studies 
of a variety of ethos elements by Strother (1951), of "sincere" and 
"insincere" speakers by Hildreth (1953), and words superimposed at sub-
liminal levels of intensity on the screening of a filmed speech by 
Steiner (1959) have produced unimpressive results. The question of the 
influence of nonverbal status cues on speaker ethos is not well answered. 
A little evidence does point in that direction. Likewise, some evidence 
points in the direction of an influential relationship between personal 
or physical attraction and speaker ethos. Of major importance is the 
finding by Andersen (1961) that audience perceptions of the ethos 
material contained in a speech interact with the audience's prior 
estimations of the ethos of the speaker. 
Factor Analytical Studies of Source Credibility 
Perhaps the most sophisticated approach known today to the 
problem of identification of all the variables influential in a behavioral 
system is that of factor analysis. The application of this technique 
to date collected by semantic differential scales has been made by several 
scholars. 
Exploratory factor analysis studies by Tannenbaum (1953), 
Berlo and Kumata (1957), and Bettinghaus (1959) employed semantic 
differential scales to measure image of the speaker. However, these 
studies employed only the evaluative dimension of the semantic differential. 
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A second group of factor analytical studies employed bipolar scales 
intended to include factors of evaluation, potency, and activity identified 
by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), as well as other factors which 
might not be covered by these three dimensions. A detailed description 
and analysis of this second group of factor analytical ~tudies and a 
consideration of the possible relationships of the findings contained 
therein to a theory of interpersonal trust was made by Giffin (1966B). 
The following discussion of the dimensions which seemingly cause 
interpersonal trust, as found in factor analytical studies of source 
credibility, is basically a synthesis of Giffin's earlier work. 
Andersen (1961) developed new multivariate semantic differentjal 
scales by which (p. 110) "two major factors in the image of the speaker 
were isolated, the evaluative and dynamism factors." Andersen labeled 
the first factor evaluative because it was consonant with the evaluative 
dimension isolated previously in research by Tannenbaum (1953), Berlo and 
Kumata (1957), and Bettinghaus (1959). Items relative to intelligence, 
character and good will loaded heavily on this evaluative factor. 
Scales which composed the second factor isolated by Andersen 
(1961) had previously appeared on both the activity and the potency factors 
isolated in work on other concepts by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957); 
because of the way in which these scales combined to produce a heavy 
loading on this second factor Andersen labeled this factor dynamism. 
Another attempt to establish the dimensions of source 
credibility by factor analysis of data collected by semantic differential 
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scales was conducted by Berlo and LeNert over a number of years and 
reported in progress by Berlo (1961) and near completion by Lemert (1963). 
According to Lemert (1963) the same three dominant factors emerged in 
each of four factor analyses; he labeled them safety, qualification and 
dynamism. A weaker fourth factor emerged in three of the four analyses, 
labeled sociability by Lemert (p. 6). The twelve bi-polar semantic 
differential scales, representing the three dominant dimensions, were: 
(1) Safety: honest-dishonest, openminded-closedminded, 
safe-dangerous, objective-subjective. 
(2) Qualification: trained-untrained, experience-inexperienced, 
informed-uninformed, educated-uneducated. 
(3) Dynamism: bold-timid, colorful-dull, frank-reserved, 
extroverted-introverted. 
A third attempt to factor analyze the dimensions of source 
credibility of public speakers was recently completed by Markham (1965). 
Three factors, one quite strong and two of moderate strength, accounted 
for 47.77 percent of the total variance. The first factor (p. 69) Markham 
labeled reliable-logical-evaluative. This factor corresponded very 
closely in item similarity and size of loadings to the evaluative factor 
in the original Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) study (pp. 70-71). 
The second factor Markham labeled (p. 70) activity. 
factor (p. 70) was labeled nice-guy. 
Markham's third 
Following the pattern established by Andersen (1961), a series 
of experimental studies was designed by McCroskey (1966). The literature 
on ethos was surveyed; thirty items were developed for a Likert-type 
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instrument; introductions for two hypothetical speakers were prepared, 
one with presumably high ethos-building descriptions of the "speaker," 
the other with low; responses on the Likert-type scale of fifty subjects 
to each of these "speaker" introductions were factor analyzed. Two 
factors were found, labeled by Mccroskey as authoritativeness and character. 
Mccroskey noted that these two factors were highly similar to the first 
two of the three factors reported earlier by Berlo (1961): competence 
and trustworthiness. 
McCroskey (1966) noted the lack of appearance of a dynamism 
factor identified by Andersen (1961) and Lemert (1963). However, he 
indicated that he had developed no items in his Likert-type scale which 
seemed to be designed to uncov'er such a dimension. 
McCroskey (1966) also reports the development of a forty-item 
semantic differential instrument using essentially the same procedure 
(p. 66) as that employed in developing the Likert-type scales. Factor 
analysis produced two factors again identified by Mccroskey as 
authoritativeness and character. Making the assumption that authoritativeness 
and character are the constituent parts of ethos, Mccroskey developed 
separate twenty-item L1.kert-type scales to measure each of these two 
dimensions. He noted that the importance of the "good will" factor 
suggested by Aristotle and the factor of "speaker intentions" suggested by 
Hovland had not appeared, although two items on the character scales 
appeared to be related to these concepts. 
Mccroskey also developed two new semantic differential scales, 
one to measure authoritativeness and another to mea5ure character. 
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Summary of the Dimensions 
Let us again raise the question: what has been found concerning 
the dimensions involved in ethos or source credibility? What factors 
of a speaker are perceived by a listener which influence the speaker's 
image in the mind of the listener? From the answer to this question we 
can draw inferences and formulate more defensible hypotheses concerning 
the variables influencing a listener's trust of a speaker. 
From the studies of Hovland and his associates (1953), 
Andersen (1961), Lemert (1963), Markham (1965), Mccroskey (1966), and 
King (1966) there is evidence that one of the factors influencing the 
receiver's perception of the credibility of a communicator is his degree 
of expertness (authoritativeness or intelligence). This can occur by 
presentation of an "introduction" of a speaker, even though the actual 
speaker never appears. This factor can be measured by a Likert-type 
scale, as demonstrated by Andersen (1961) and by Mccroskey (1966), and 
by a semantic differential, as demonstrated specifically by Mccroskey (1966). 
There is also general support for the measurability of this 
factor by the semantic differential technique in the evaluative factor 
found by Andersen (1961), in the- qualification factor found by Lemert 
(1963), and in the reliable-logic-evaluative factor found by Markham (1965). 
There is evidence that a second factor influencing the receiver's 
perception of the credibility of a communicator is his character in terms 
of the value system of the receiver. Support for this statement is found 
in the studies reported by Andersen (1961), Lemert (1963), Markham (1965), 
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Mccroskey (1966), and less specifically by the evaluative factor found 
by Andersen (1961), and the safety factor found by Lemert {1963), and 
the nice-guy factor identified by Markham (1965). 
There is some evidence to support Aristotle's third 
variable,"good will," which is similar to the variable suggested by 
Hovland and his associates (1953, p. 21), "the speaker's intent to 
communicate the assertions he considers most valid." Support for this 
variable is found in the studies reported by Andersen (1961), Lemert 
(1963), and, to a limited extent in the study reported by MarkhaJil (1965). 
Evidence of the measurability of ~his factor by the semantic differential 
technique is not very convincing, although there certainly are traces of 
it in the evaluative factor identified by Andersen (1961), in the safety 
factor found by Lemert (1963), and in the relatively weak nice-guy factor 
found by Markham (1965). 
A fourth factor, labeled dynamism or activity, was found by 
Andersen (1961), Lemert (1963), and by Markham (1965). Giffin (1966b) 
points to evidence which indicates that this factor operates with more 
strength in response to speakers actually giving speeches than to responses 
elicited by the images of well known persons or to introductions for 
speakers not actually presented to the respondents. Evidence of the 
measurability of this factor by a semantic differential was presented by 
Andersen (1961), by Lemert (1963), and by Markham (1965). According to 
all three studies this factor is related to impressions of a speaker's 
relative degree of activity (or the impression of something identified by 
~the listener as activity). 
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In some weaker but still identifiable factors discovered 
by factor analysis there is an indication of a possible influence of 
personal attraction, likability or affiliation. Lemert's fourth factor 
of sociability possibly involving cheerfulness and kindliness, seems to 
indicate this possibility. Markham's weaker factors include scale items 
supporting this inference, for example, attractive-unattractive, cheerful-
gloomy, pleasant-unpleasant, likable-unlikable, admirable-contemptible, 
kind-cruel, friendly-unfriendly, and sociable-unsociable. In no sense 
is this factor as strong as the others, and its measurability is not well 
supported. Even so, there is enough evidence to indicate a very real 
possibility of its value, and in future studies it should not be ignored. 
Studies of Interpersonal Trust in Small Groups 
Two behavioral scientists have studied the problem of trust: 
Morton Deutsch and Jack Gibb. In each case their research has stretched 
over a number of years. 
Deutsch began investigating cooperation and competition in 
1949 and in the mid-fifties his concern turned to interpersonal trust. 
Deutsch (1958) reported that he was the first to study trust in the 
laboratory. After defining trust and related terms, he (1958) turned 
to a number of hypotheses centering around the factors which tend to 
increase or decrease the probability of interpersonal trust. Deutsch's 
first-level hypotheses asserted that: (1) as there is an increase in an 
individual's confidence that his trust will be reciprocated, the 
probability of his engaging in trusting behavior will increase; and (2) as 
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the ratio of anticipated positive to negative consequences increases, 
the probability of his engaging in trusting behavior will increase. 
Other hypotheses were concerned with the factors which affect the 
individual's confidence that his trust will be fulfilled. These 
hypotheses were related to the influence of such factors as intentions, 
power communication, third parties, and the individual's self-esteem. 
Deutsch's experiments utilized a two-person non-zero-sum game. 
The game is a variation of the prisoner's dilemma and the gains or losses 
incuq:-red by each person are a function of the choices made by the two 
persons. 
Deutsch's subjects were college students who understood the 
game. Throughout his various published accounts of the use of the game, 
Deutsch has emphasized the principle noted in his 1958 paper: 
The essential psychological feature of the game is 
that there is no possibility for "rational" behavior 
in it unless the conditions for mutual trust exist. (p. 270) 
The aims of Deutsch's studies were: (1) to ascertain if the 
experimental conditions would elicit trust or suspicion, and (2) to study 
further some of the conditions which might affect trust. These experiments 
involved subjects who were led to have one of three motivational 
orientations: 
(1) Cooperative: each subject was led to feel that both he 
and the other person were concerned with the welfare of 
the other. 
(2) Individualistic: each subject was led to feel that he 
must only be concerned with his own welfare. 
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(3) Competitive: each subject was led to feel that he must 
do as he could for himself and also better than the other. 
The experiments were also conducted under the following four conditions: 
(1) No communication between the two persons. 
(2) Communication: the subjects were allowed to communicate 
before choosing. 
(3) Non-simultaneous: the first subject made a chojce, and 
the choice made by him was announced to the second subject 
before the second subject made his choice. 
(4) Reversibility: oath subjects announced their choices, 
and either or both could change. They could continue 
changing as long as they desired. 
In all four experimental conditions a cooperative orientation 
led primarily to cooperative choices, resul'ting in mutual gain. However, 
a competitive orientation led to choices primarily influenced by the 
/ 
specific situational conditions. Under non-simultaneous and non-communication 
conditions the results of the individualistic and competitive orientations 
were similar, whereas under communication and reversibility the individualistic 
and cooperative orientations were similar. (Deutsch, 1958, p. 271) 
These results suggest that when communication is absent and 
one has to choose without knowledge of the other person's choices, a 
cooperative orientation will tend to produce trusting and trustworthy 
behavior. On the other hand, a competitive orientation will tend to result 
in suspecting rather than trusting behavior, even when situational factors 
such as communication possibilities are encouraging. In contrast to both 
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the cooperative and competitive orientations, which are not influenced 
by situational factors to any great extent, the individualistically 
oriented person is influenced greatly by situational determinants. 
Deutsch (1958) also reports experimental studies of some of 
the social or situational conditions under which mutual trust could 
arise between subjects who originally have an individualistic orientation. 
These studies were conducted by students of Deutsch: Loomis (1959), 
Solomon (1960), and Farr (1957). 
-
Loomis (1959) studied the influence of communication on 
mutual trust. He employed a game similar to the one used by Deutsch. 
About two hundred college students each played five trials wher~ Player II 
was always the confederate of the experimenter. The subjects were all 
individualistically oriented. Ten experimental groups were selected, 
half of the members "note-senders" and the other half "note-receivers." 
A control group without such communication was also employed. The notes 
were standardized forms which expressed expectation, intention, retaliation, 
and absolution. The use of notes experimentally produced a higher degree 
of perceived trust, both in the senders and the receivers. Whereas about 
one-tenth of the non-communicating subjects were able to perceive trust 
in the other person, two-thirds of the communicating subjects perceived 
trust. The percentage of perceived trust increased as communication 
increased. Finally, about eighty percent of all subjects made choices 
consistent with their perception of the interpersonal relationship. 
Deutsch (1958), in summarizing this research, concluded that communication 
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is likely to be effective to the extent that the basic features of a 
cooperative interrelationship are manifested in the communication. 
Deutsch outlined the basic features of a cooperative relationship as: 
(1) Expression of one's intentions. 
(2) Expression of one's expectations. 
(3) Expression of one's planned reaction to violation of 
one's expectation. 
(4) Expression of a means of restoring cooperation after a 
violation of one's expectation. (Deutsch, 1958, p. 275) 
Solomon (1960) investigated the influence of certain types of 
power relationships and motivational strategies upon the development of 
trust. Game matrices for four power conditions were set up in the 
experiment. One member of the dyad was a subJect while the other was a 
"confederate11 of the experimenter. The "confederate" interacted ¼ith 
the subject in one of three conditions of relative power--the confederate 
' 
in absolute power, partial power, and equal power. The confederate 
employed one of three types of game' strategies in each power condition--
conditional cooperation, unconditional cooperation, and non-cooperation. 
Solomon's findings suggest that: 
(1) A subject is more likely to engage in trusting behavior 
as the amount of power he has over the trusted person is 
increased. 
(2) Under conditions of equal power, a subject tends to respond 
to unconditional cooperation by another person with 
exploitative game behavior, whereas he tends to cooperate 
more with a conditionally cooperative person. 
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Deutsch (1958) remarked that the results of this study indicate that an 
individual is more likely to trust another if he believes the other person 
has nothing to gain from untrustworthy behavior and if he perceives that 
he is able to exert some control over the other's outcome. 
Farr (1957) studied the influence of a third party on 
interpersonal trust. The experiment was designed to determine if two 
' 
individualistically oriented players in the game situation would trust 
each other more if they knew both disliked a third player. The 
results were that the introduction of a disliked third person significantly 
increased the tendency to make trusting choices. 
In 1960, Deutsch (1960a) reported an investigation of trust, 
trustworthiness, and the F scale. Deutsch had his subjects play an 
interpersonal game in which they were required, in one situation, to 
choose between trusting and suspecting another person. In a second 
situation, subjects were re~µired to choose between acting in a trust-
worthy manner and an untrustworthy manner. SubJects who were more 
trusting were more likely to be more trustworthy, indicating that behavior 
toward another person is congruent with what one expects from the other, 
and that what one expects from the other is congruent with one's behavior 
towards others. The F scale scores of the players correlated significantly 
with game behavior; subjects with low F scores tended to be trusting and 
trustworthy, whereas subgects with high F scores tended to be more 
suspicious and untrustworthy. These correlations have demonstrated a 
relationsh~p between trusting and untrusting behavior and a measurable 
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personality dimension. These findings also support the hypothesis that 
individuals have general predispositjons, of varying degrees, to trust 
or distrust others. 
Evans (1964) reported the use of a two-person non-zero-sum 
game in an experiment concerned with the effect of unilateral promise, 
enforceable or unenforceable, upon cooperation and trust. The results 
were that subjects receiving an enforceable promise were more cooperative 
than subjects receiving no promise. SubJects under both promise conditions 
rated the promiser more trustworthy than did subjects under the no-promise 
condition. 
From the work of Deutsch and his students, the following 
conclusions can be drawn concerning interpersonal trust in the communication 
process: 
(1) A cooperative (or non-cooperative) or1entation on the part 
of the listener will influence his tendency to trust a 
speaker. 
(2) Communication between the speaker and listener will tend to 
increase the likelihood of interpersonal trust between them, 
expecially if the speaker and listener express their 
intentions and expectations regarding interpersonal trust, 
and indicate their plan of reacting to violations of their 
expectations. 
(3) Increased social power over the communicator by the listener 
increases the likelihood of the listener trusting the communicator. 
(4) A listener will tend to trust a speaker if he knows they 
both dislike a specified third person. 
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(5) Trusting listeners probably have identifiable personality 
factors similar to those persons who produce high scores 
on the F scale. 
Jack Gibb's (1962a) long-range research efforts have emphasized 
the reduction of defensive behavior in groups. This defensive behavior 
seemed to be caused partly by distrust. In later work Gibb (1961) began to 
focus on trust and its development. His approach follows developmental 
lines frequently associated with the clinic more than found in the 
laboratory. Basically, Gibb (1964) has presented a theoretical formulation 
of the relationships between trust and primary dimensions of group 
development. 
Gibb (1964) reported that his research on (p. 280) "a wide 
variety of groups in various life settings" indicated that people are 
concerned about four basic goals which are inevitably derived from all 
social interaction. These "concerns" generate forces presumed helpful 
in their reduction; relationships between these primary concerns, derivative 
concerns, and their symptoms are outlined in Table 1 on the following page. 
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TABLE I 
MODAL CONCERNS ,IN GROUP DEVELOPMENT* 
Primary Derivative Symptoms of Symptoms of 
Modal Modal Unresolved Resolved 
Concerns Concerns Concern Concern 
Acceptance Membership Fear Acceptance 
Distrust Trust 
Data Decision Polite facade Spontaneity 
Caution strategy Process feedback 
Goal Productivity Apathy Creative work 
Competition or play 
Control Organization Dependency Interdependence 
Counterdependency Role distribution 
* From Gibb (1964, p. 281) 
The acceptance concern according to Gibb (1964) is related to 
the formation of trust and acceptance of self and others (p. 280). Trust 
of self and ,others is facilitated by a supportive climate or climate of 
trust. Gibb's theory of group development, reflected in Table II, was 
derived from analysis of tape recordings of a large number of human relations 
training groups CT-Groups). Gibb's approach allowed the identification 
of early, "persuasive" attempts on the part of group members. These 
persuasive attempts are outlined in Table III. Here fear and distrusting 




DIMENSIONS IN GROUP AND PERSONAL GROWfH * 
Primary Derivative Signs of Signs of 
Modal Modal Personal Group 
Concerns Concerns Growth Growth 
Acceptance Membership Acceptance of Supportive climate, 
Self and Others climate of trust 
Data Decision Spontaneity, Reality communication, 
awareness functional feedback 
Goal Productivity Integration, Goal integration, 
directionality tractability level 
Control Organization Interdependence Interdependence, 
participative action 
and structure 
* From Gibb (1964, p. 288) 
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TABLE III 
































At a later time, "participative" behavior, involving 
confidence and trust, produce reactions from the group identified in 
Table IV as trust, diversity, and exploitation of opportunities to 
achieve group progress. 
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TABLE IV 
LATER, "PARTICIPATIVE" TECHNOLOGIES IN GROUPS* 
Modal Entry Reaction 
Concern Behavior in Group 
Acceptance Confidence Trust 
(Membership) Trust Diversity, exploitation 
Data Openness Fee.~back, exposure 
(Decision) Spontaneity Consensus potential 
Goal Self-assessment Ego strength 
(Productivity) Problem solving Creativity 
Control Permissiveness Participative form 
(Organization) Interdependence Participativ:e function 
* From Gibb (1964, p. 294) 
Table V and Table VI indicate in more detail the relationship 
between the acceptance concern, reactions to persuasive technologies, and 
reactions to participative technologies. These tables sketch Gibb's 
theory of personal and group growth development. 
Inferences from Gibb's work for a theory of interpersonal 
trust are easy to make: interpersonal trust is facilitated by communication 
which is perceived as descriptive rather than evaluative, oriented toward 
problems instead of interpersonal control, spontaneous rather than 
strategic, empathic rather than neutral, indicative of an attitude of 
equality instead of superiority, and expressive of provisionally held 
viewpoints rather than dogmatic certainties. 
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TABLE V 















Modal Reactions to Persuasive 
Technologies (Symptoms of 
Unresolved Concerns) 
Distrust and accompanying denial 
Fears of personal inadequacy 
Legalism; quibbling 
Resistance to initiation of action 
Bartering of personability; 
"polite behavior" 
Atrophy of affection 
Concern over inclusion~ protective 
pairing 
Controls; reporting requirements 
Specificity of channeling and 
structure 
Conformity; rituals; restriction of 
range of behavior 
Ambiguity; maximization of projection 
Strategy; gimmicks, tricks 
Fear of the unknown 
Facade building; secrecy 
Distortion of data through channels 
Caution; pretense; protective 
phraseology 
False assumptions; inadequate theory 
Extremes in slow or rapid decision 
making 
Circumvention; grapevine behavior 
Deceit; dishonesty; intrapersonal 
disparities 
Increased communication downward 
with screening 











* From Gibb (1964) p. 295. 
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Apathy, flight; withdrawal 
Resistance, passive or active 
Increased use of extrinsic rewards 
Increased approval and status needs 
Low commitment; overaspiration 
Extreme of frenetic or apathetic 
work 
Persuasion; advice; "helping" or 
changing others 
Manipulation; coercion 
Competition; rivalry; jealousy; 
favoritism 
Need for structure or personal 
leaders 
Displaced feelings of responsibility 
Atrophy of self; loss of identity; 
stereotype 
Intrapersonal conflict 
"Pumping" of motivation by 
interpersona] conflict 
Chaos; disorganization; cynicism 
about control 
Dependency; regressive behavior 
Counterdependency; resistance to 
control 
Hostilrty, often latent or consciously 
masked 
Power struggles; fight; symbolic 
fight; debate 
Bargaining; limited war 
Status and power concerns 
Formalization of rules and structure 
Concerns about leadership 
Formal job prescriptions, organiza-
tional positioning 



















Modal Reactions to Participative 
Technologies (Symptoms of 
Unresolved Concerns) 
Trust and acceptance of distrust 
Greater feeling of personal 
adequacy 
Acceptance of legitimate 
influence 
Positive affect towards members 
Diversity and nonconformity 
Acceptance of motives of others 
Easy expression of feeling and 
conflict 
Facade reduction 
Acceptance of idiosyncratic 
behavior 
Controls over processes, 
not people 
Clarity; minimization of 
defense 
Problem-solving behavior 
Trust! reduction of suspicion 
Increased feedback upward 
Freedom of movement outside 
channels 
Reduction of intrapersonal 
disparities 
Open expression of feeling and 
conflict 












Freedom of form 
* From Gibb, (1964) p. 297. 
Work Orientation 
Visibility of intrinsic 
motivations 
Reduction of competitive 
behavior 
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Reduction of conflict 
Creativity in sustained work 
Increased involvement in tasks 
Reduction of apathy 
Reduced need for work structure 
Diversity of behavior and 
attitude 
Increasing congruence between 
work and play 
Reduced potency of extrinsic 
rewards 
Nonconformj ty 
High personal i den ti ty; ego 
strength 
Interdependence 
Diversity and nonconformity 
Fluidity of organizatjon 
Greater unpredictability of 
behavior 
Reduced latent hostility 
Allocation of work by consensus 
or ability 
Reduction of symbolic fight 
Open expression of feeling and 
conflict 
Informall ty 
Spontaneity of form 
Reduced concern over organization 
form 
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Studies of Conform1ty 
There is a series of studies which do not report work on 
trust as such, but very clearly study an individual's attitude change 
which is influenced by that individual's reliance upon or trust in the 
communication of the other members of the group. They are known as the 
stu,dies of conformity. 
The Asch (1951) study was a prototype for a large number of 
studies showing that an individual tends to be greatly influenced by the 
communication of the majority when he is in a group situation. This has 
been demonstrated in many experimental studies reported by Asch (1951, 
1952, 1956, 1958) and by Crutchfield (1954a, 1954b, 1955, 1958, 1959a, 
1959b, 1962) . 
The evidence from the conformity studies indicates that an 
individual would rather believe what he is told by the majority of his 
associates in spite of evidence of their lack of expertness, reUability, 
and good intentions. 
Let us examine the available information. The studies on 
conformity have been summarized in such textbooks on social psychology as 
Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962) and Homans (1961). Research on 
conformity and group cohesiveness has been summarized by Golembiewski 
(1962) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959). Giffin (1966b, pp. 56-66) pointed 
to the study of trust in the commtmication process. 
The primary question investigated in the studies on conformity 
is this: ~oes the individual trust the statements of communicators in 
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the group more than his own perceptual senses? The conditions imposed 
by this question are: (1) group opinion is contrary to his own personal 
opinion, and (2) he must be made to demonstrate an opinion change. 
Sherif (1935) demonstrated that when pairs of subjects 
judged the "movement" of a stationary light in a dark room, the judgments 
tended to converge toward each other. 
Asch's (1951) approach was to assemble groups of seven to 
-
nine college students and have them judge the relative lengths of lines 
on cardboard. All but one of the students were confederates of the 
experimenter who had been instructed to give unifonn but incorrect 
responses. This one naive student gave his judgment following most of 
the others; his judgment thus appeared to him to be in opposition to a 
unanimous opinion of the rest of the group. 
Crutchfield's technique was to seat five subjects in individual 
booths, each containing a panel of switches and lights. The switches 
allowed the subject to indicate his chosen responses, and the lights 
purportedly indicated the responses of each other subject in the group. 
The signal lights were actually controlled by the experimenter and they 
alledgedly showed the subject the responses of the other four subjects 
before he made his chosen response. Of course, the experimenter could 
feed incorrect and correct responses to the unsuspecting subjects. 
In a typical one-hour session, fifty "group" pressure items could be 
presented, with "neutral" (correct response) items interspersed. The 
items varied widely in content--some involving objective fact, others 
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were difficult. Crutchfield ran such studies on more than 600 people, 
all of them above average in intelligence, education and occupational 
status. 
The findings of the Asch (1951~ 1952, 1956, 1958) studies 
indicated a marked movement toward the majority; over one-third of all 
the estimates were errors identical with or in the direction of 
"distorted" estimates of the confederate majority, with virtually no 
errors in the contTol groups. Experimental variations by Asch (1958) 
indicated that a disturbance of the majority by the presence of a subject 
who gave true responses markedly increased the independence of the critical 
subjects. The withdrawal of this "true" partner by having him initially 
respond correctly antl then switch to join the confederate majority produced 
a powerful and surprising effect--it restored the majority effect to full 
force. The opposite condition or the late switching of a "true" partner 
reduced the level of yielding to about nine percent, but did not completely 
contravene the influence of the remaining confederates. In another 
variation of experimental conditions, the influence of the size of the 
unanimous confederate majority was explored. With the confederate 
opposition reduced to one person, the erroneous influence all but 
disappeared; with the opposition to one naive subject increased to three, 
I 
the majority effect appeared in full force. Further increases in the 
number of confederate opponents did not significantly change the results. 
In post-experimental interviews with the naive subjects Asch found that 
they tended to question their own judgments, not that of the majority; 
that they "longed" to agree with the majority; and that they missed the 
the feeling of being a part of (belonging to) the group. 
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Crutchfield's (1954b, 1955, 1958, 1959b, 1962) findings are 
briefly summarized in Krech, Crutchfield and Ballac~ey. (1962, pp. 509-511) 
They were abstracted by Giffin (1966b, p. 59) as follows: 
(1) Substantial amounts of yielding were produced despite the 
fact that bogus group consensus was manifestly wrong; for 
example, 46 percent of fifty military officers agreed that 
a star, actually one-third smaller than a circle, was the 
larger. 
(2) Many individuals could be pressured into yielding on an 
opinion item which degraded them personally; for example, 
37 percent of the military officers tes~ed, a~re~d that 
th~y probdbly did not make a good leader. 
(3) Yielding was far greater on difficult items than on easy 
ones. 
(4) There were extremely large individual differences in 
amount of yielding, with some individuals giving way Qn 
almost all items, and some yielding on none. 
(5) When individuals are retested privately, a significant 
part of the yielding disappears, but by no means all of 
it; for example, in a study of applicants to medical 
school, about 50 percent of the original group-pressure 
effect persisted. 
The degree of conformity reported by Asch and Crutchfield has 
been shown to be related to a number of situational and personality factors. 
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Situational factors include type of issue involvect, size of the group, 
perceived col!fpetency of the group, group unanimity, extremety of 
group opinion, and group cohesiveness. The evidence relating these 
situational factors to conformity is outlined below. 
Type of Issue 
Coleman, Blake and Mouton (1958) supported findings 0£ 
Crutchfield that type of issue or problem is related to influence of 
contrary group opinion, with correlations of about .89 between degree 
of yielding and degree of difficulty of the item; they also found direct 
evidence that greater yielding on difficult items related to the degree 
of certainty felt by the individual concerning his own judgment. Supporting 
evidence was also found by Tuddenham (1957) and by Rosner (1957). 
Size of Group 
Group pressure is more intense the larger the unanimous 
majority opposing the individual up to three persons; more than three 
produces little further change, even if fifteen persons are included. 
(Asch, 1958) 
Perceived Competency of the Group 
The degree of competency of the opposition, as perceived by 
the individual is directly related to the majority influence. In one of 
Crutchfield's studies groups of professional mathematicians were subjected 
to the standard group-pressure treatment, including some items involving 
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mathematical logic. Some of these mathematicians were subjected to 
the standard group-pressure treatment, including some items involving 
mathematical logic. Some of these mathematicians conformed to a false 
group consensus on wrong answers they never would have given under 
ordinary circumstances. (Giffin, 1966b, p. 60) 
Group Unanimity 
Asch (1958) demonstrated the degree of effect of unanimity 
of the opposition. When the individual has the support of one other 
person, yielding is markedly lower. This finding suggests that the 
great social significance of one dissident voice, loud and clear, in 
, 
strengthening the independent judgment o± like-minded members ot a 
minority opinion. 
I 
Extremity of Group Opinion 
The extremity of the opinion by the majority is a factor 
influencing the degree of group-pressure of the individual. Tuddenham 
(1961) found that when the distorted opinion lies well outside the range 
of ordinarily acceptable judgment, yielding occurs in fewer individuals, 
and to a much lesser degree. 
Group Cohesiveness 
According to Golembiewski (1962), "group cohesiveness" has 
come to lie defined in small group research as the (p. 151) "attraction of 
a group for its members." The operational definition of cohesiveness 
has come to mean the resultant attraction of forces exerted by the group 
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for a member to (1) stay in the group and (2) leave the group. These 
forces include personal attractiveness or unattractiveness of people in 
the group's tasks or activities (including resultant rewards), and 
prestige or loss of it associated with belonging to the group. 
(Giffin, 1966, p. 61) 
Evidence of the influence of cohesiveness on conformity was 
demonstrated by Gerard (1954) and by Jackson and Saltzstein (1958). 'A 
similar influence of reference groups (groups whose behavior is admired 
or imitated) was found by Crutchfield (1959a); persons belonging to ethnic 
or racial minorities conformed highly when tested in groups where they 
were the only such minority member. Harvey and Consalvi (1960) discovei-ed 
that the second highest status member in a small group was more conforming 
than either the leader or those lower in status. 
Personality factors influential in an indi v:i dual' s confo::tming 
to group opinion have been studied primarily by Crutchfield. His findings 
are summarized in Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey (1962). Giffin (1966b, 
p. 62) abstracted these findings as follows: 
1(1) Conformists are significantly less intelligent as measured 
on the Concept Mastery Test developed by Terman (1956). 
(2) Conformists are clearly lower in "ego-strength" and in 
ability to work under stress as measured on the Manifest 
Anxiety Scale developed by Taylor (1953). 
(3) Conformists are inclined toward pronounced feelings of 
personal inferiority and inadequacy as measured on the 
Adjective Qheck List developed by Gough (1960). 
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(4) Conformists exhibit intense preoccupation with other 
people, as contrasted with the more self-contained, 
autonomous interpersonal attitudes of the independent 
persons. 
(5) The conformists express attitudes and values of a far 
more conventional and moralistic nature than do the 
independent subjects. Support for this point was 
provided by Nadler (1959) who found F-scale scores 
correlated .48 with conformity scores measured by 
the Asch technique. 
What explanation can be offered for the conformity behavior 
described above? It seems that such behavior can be explained, at least 
in part, by a need to validate one's perceptions of social and physical 
reality. It is suggested that some of the conformity exhibited by the 
subjects in the preceding experiments was the result of their attempts 
to gain a correct understanding of the world about them by checking with 
other people. That an individual would question his own judgment when 
he sees that the majority's perception of the object or issue involved 
contradicts his, seems quite natural. The data by Tuddenham (1957), 
Rosner (1957), and Coleman, Blake and Moulton (1958) showing that 
subjects conformed more on difficult items when they were less certain 
of their own judgments seems to support the contention that the individual 
does, in fact, use the opinions of others to gain an understanding of the 
world around him. 
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The evidence indicating that conformity behavior is related 
to identifiable personality factors seems to lend support, at least 
indirectly, to the contention that individuals maintain certain 
predispositions to either trust or distrust those around them: that 
people can be characterized as to the degree that they are "trusting" 
or "distrustful" individuals. 
The Theory in Summary 
Let us briefly summarize the major components of the theory 
of interpersonal trust in small--group communication. Our conceptualization 
attempted to explain the existence of trust in ,small group communication 
behavior by asking two basic questions. The first questfon -Nas: why do 
individuals tend to trust or distrust each other? 
question, it is suggested that: 
In answer to tlns 
(1) Trusting and distrusting behaviors are preceded by, and 
based upon, attitudes regarding the trustworthiness of 
other individuals. 
(2) These interpersonal attitudes of trust and distrust are 
grounded in the individual's motivation to reduce the 
risk involved in either satisfying his needs or preventing 
their frustration. 
(3) Attitudes of trust and distrust for other people are 
first learned during the period of babyhood. 
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(4) As a result of one's childhood and later experience, 
individuals maintain general orientations regarding 
the trustworthiness of the world. Each individual's 
orientation manifests itself in the form of a general 
predisposition, of a certain degree, to either trust 
or distrust others. 
Our second major question viewed interpersonal trust as a 
dependent variable. This question was: what are the communicatiou factors -- -- -- -------
which influence interpersonal trust, and how are these factors related? 
The theory's answer to this question follows: 
(1) The factors which directly influence interpersonal 
trust in small group communication appear to be the 
listener's perception of these characteristics of the 
speaker: 
(a) Expertness relevant to the topic under discussion 
may be in the form of quantity of pertinent information, 
degree of ability or skill, or validity of judgment. 
(b) Reliability as an information source may be perceived 
as dependability, predictabjlity, or consistency. 
(c) Intentions toward the trusting person may be perceived 
by him as favorable. 
(d) Activeness of the speaker or communication behavior 
which appears to be more active than passive may be 
perceived by the listener. 
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(e) Personal attraction of the speaker for the listener, 
a dimension difficult to measure, possibly non,... 
rational or non cognitive, may be operating without 
conscious perception by the listener and without 
his knowledge of interaction with one or more of the 
four factors listed above. 
(£) Majority opinion of the others may be present 
regarding the degree of trust that should be placed 
in the communication of any one of the members of 
the immediate group or audience. 
(2) It is suggested that the individual is motivate<l to 
maintain a cognitive structure which correctly maps 
physical and social reality concerning, the ,.-a.lue of 
himself and others along some dimension. It is further 
suggested that the dimensions used by the iridi vi dual to 
determine the trustworthiness of other people are the 
previously mentioned communication factors. 
(3) Evidence from the conformity studies indicates that 
the individual's estimate of the trustworthiness of 
other people may be influence more by the opinion of 
the majority of the others present in the groups to 
which he belongs than any of the other communication 
factors. 
(4) Interpersonal trust is facilitated by communication 
which is perceived as descriptive rather than evaluative, 
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oriented toward problems instead of interpersonal 
control, spontaneous rather than strategic, empathic 
rather than neutral, indicative of an attitude of 
equality instead of superiority, and expressive of 
provisionally held viewpoints rather than dogmatic 
certainties,. 
(5) A cooperative or non-cooperative orientation on the 
part of the listener will influence his tendency to 
trust a speaker. 
(6) Communication between the speaker and listener will 
tend to increase the likelihood of interpersonal trust 
between them, especially if they express their intentions 
and expectations regarding interpersonal trust, and 
indicate their plan of reacting to violations of their 
expectations. 
(7) Increased social power over the communicator by the 
listener increases the likelihood of the listener 
trusting the communicator. 
(8) Trusting listeners probably have identifiable personality 
factors similar to those persons who produce high scores 
on.the F scale. Evidence from conformity studies suggests 
that personality traits such as intelligence, ego-strength, 
ability to work under stress, feelings of personal inferi-
ority and inadequacy, and the amount of preoccupation with 
other people, may distinguish the trusting from the dis-
trustful listener. 
CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES AND CONCLUSIONS 
The previously outlined theory is broad and its testing 
could involve several approaches using many specific hypotheses. It is 
believed that with the use of ingeneous research designs several tenents 
of this conceptualization can be tested. The experimental approaches 
and hypotheses which are deemed by this writer to merit immediate attention 
are outlined below. 
The Problem of Measurement 
As was indicated earlier, the only approach exclusively 
developed to measure trust between individuals was explored by Deutsch 
(1958J and his students, Loomis (1959) and Solomon (1960). Mor~ 
recently, Rapaport (1962) and Roby and Carterette (1965) explored the 
same approach. Under this paradigm, inferences about comparative degrees 
of trust "in the mind of the trusting person" are made by varying the 
degree of risk involved in "trusting choice" situations. Since, what 
may appear to the experimenter to be a "trusting choice," may not 
appear to the subject ot require any risk (or trust) at all, this writer 
suggests that other measurement approaches are needed to both measure 
trust independently, and i:o test the validity of Deutsch's "trusting 
choice" technique. 
It would appear that the self-descriptive inventory approach 
can be useful in solving the problem of measuring trust. That Likert-type 
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scales and semantic differentials could measure trust independently, 
and that they would identify the same elements as does Deutsch's approach, 
is speculative. However, it does seem that the following hypotheses 
are in order: 
Hypothesis J: A reliable and valid instrument for the 
measurement of interpersonal trust can be developed by 
using a Likert-type scale. 
Hypothesis.!_!_: A reliable and valid instrument for the 
measurement of interpersonal trust can be developed by 
using the semantic differential. 
Two University of Kansas graduate students have explored 
the possibilities of developing such instruments. Susan Vance Wilson 
(1967) investigated the use of the Likert-type scale as a tool to 
measure interpersonal trust. Noel White (1967) explored the use of the 
semantic differential as it could relate to measuring interpersonal 
trust. 
It is believed that., only by using the two approaches together, 
(1) observations of "trusting choices'' and (2) self-descriptive inventories, 
can we operationally define and measure interpersonal trust effectively. 
Theoretical Hypotheses 
The need-satisfaction-frustration model suggests that the 
trustworthiness of another person is a function of the probability that 
that other person will either satisfy or frustrate one's needs in the 
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future.' This concept can be tested using hypotheses and experimental 
designs similar to those found in the aforementioned studies of 
attraction and hostility. These studies utilized status and security 
needs as independent variables. The following two specific hypotheses 
could be used to experimentally test this portion of our theory of 
interpersonal trust: 
Hypothesis III: The greater the reduction in the threat 
of status loss which another person brings about, the more 
trustworthy this person becomes to the individual. 
Hypothesis IV: The greater the reduction in the threat of 
security loss which another person brings about, the more 
trustworthy this person becomes to the individual. 
The suggestion that there exists general predispositions to 
either trust or distrust could be investigated with the followjng 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis V: Individuals have general predispositions 
in measurable degrees to either trust or distrust other people. 
Hypothesis VI: Different cultures and societies exhibit 
measurably different degrees of trust and distrust. 
Portions of the cognitive-validation concept, as incorporated 
into our theory, could also be experimentally tested. We could use the 
same basic techniques described by Pepitone (1964) in his sunnnary of 
studies related to the ,cognitive-validation theories (223). Although 
many hypotheses could be formulated to test this concept and its relation 
to interpersonal trust, it appears that the following hypothesis merits 
testing: 
Hypothesis VII: When an individual interacts with a 
boastful person (a person whose estimate of his own 
worth exceeds a valid estimate as perceived by those 
around him) in a risky situation, the individual will 
develop an attitude of distrust toward the boastful 
person. 
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The specific factors which are believed to influence the 
formation of trusting or distrusting attitudes, and the relationships 
which are thought to exist between these factors, can also be tested 
experimentally. Several hypothe~es seem appropriate: 
Hypothesis VIII: Listeners will trust speakers who are 
perceived as experts on the topics under discussion more 
than speakers who are not thought to be experts on the 
topics. 
Hypothesis IX: Listeners will trust speakers who are 
perceived as being reliable (dependable, predictable, or 
consistent) more than speakers who are perceived as being 
unreliable. 
Hypothesis != Listeners will trust speakers, perceived as 
having favorable intentions, more than speakers who are 
perceived as having unfavorable intentions. 
Hypothesis XI: Listeners will trust speakers who are 
perceived as active more than speakers thought by listeners 
to be passive. 
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Hypothesis XII: The degree of trust a listener places in 
the communication of a speaker is influenced significantly 
by the opinion of the trustworthiness of the speaker as 
held by the majority of the others present. 
Hypothesis XIII: The listener's attitude of the trust-
worthiness of a speaker is influenced more by the opinion 
of the majority of others present in the groups to which 
he belongs than by the listener's independent perception 
of the speaker's expertness, reliability, intentinns, 
activeness, or personal attraction. 
Hypothesis XIV: Listeners trust speakers whose communication 
is perceived as descriptive more than speakers whose 
communication is perceived as evaluative. 
Hypothesis XV: Listeners trust speakers whose communication 
is perceived as oriented toward problems more than speakers 
whose communication is perceived to be oriented toward 
control. 
Hypothesis XVI: Listeners trust speakers whose communication 
is perceived as empathic more than speakers whose communication 
is perceived as neutral. 
Hypothesis XVII: Listeners trust speakers who are perceived 
to be viewing the listeners with attitudes of equality more 
than speakers who are perceived as considering themselves 
to be superior to their listeners. 
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Hypothesis XVIII: Speakers whose communication is perceived 
to be expressive of provisionally held viewpoints are 
trusted more than are speakers whose communication is 
perceived to be expressive of dogmatic certajnties. 
Hypothesis ~IX: Listeners with a cooperative orientation 
trust speakers more than listeners with a non-cooperative 
orientation. 
Hypothesis XX: Interpersonal trust increases as the 
amount of communication between group members-increases. 
Hypothesis XXI: Interpersonal trust increases as the 
verbal expression of intentions and expectations regarding 
interpersonal trust and the expression of a plan of 
reacting to violations of expectations increases. 
Hypothesis XX!.!_: Increased social power over the 
communicator by the listener increases the likelihood of the 
listener trusting the communicator. 
Conclusions and Comments 
A "good theory" is said to be a clear, concise and complete 
description of the relationships between parts of some process, event, or 
object which can be identified as a whole. Such a theory is based upon 
all available information which is believed to be relevant. 
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When we have little information about a part of this unitary 
whole, we theorize or make a thoughtful guess. Thus, the elaboration 
of a "good theory" imposes order on what is known and suggests fruitful 
areas for investigation. It is hoped that this theory of interpersonal 
trust will be considered a "good theory" after a substantial amount of 
experimentation has been completed. 
This study has drawn facts and hypothetical constructs from 
many related areas. The relevance of these works to the problem of 
interpersonal trust and communication has been assumed. That studies 
of aggression and hostility, source credibility~ and group cohesiveness 
have dealt with concepts pertinent to our area of investigation is 
speculative. 
A great deal of guesswork is included in this theory. 
Perhaps this is an indication of the present state of knowledge regarding 
interpersonal trust. A large amount of evidence must be accumulated 
before we can, with conviction, generalize why and how people trust and 
distrust each other. 
I think that the most important and productive iP1mediate 
contributions to the scientific investigation of interpersonal trust 
will be the development of sound experimental instruments for measuring 
trust. Without such tools, other questions are scientifically unanswerable. 
The most crucial factor determining the future quantity and 
quality of information we will have regarding this important problem 
is the amount of scientific interest scholars take in interpersonal 
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trust and communication in coming years. Scholars involved in the 
early work on interpersonal trust can help generate interest in the 
problem by selecting important questions and by carefully planning and 
' 
executing their experiments. 
It is hoped that many of the hyp.otheses in this study will 
be eventually tested. Regardless of ,~1ether or not the claims put 
forward are substan~iated, the writer will know that other scholars 
ascribed importance to the claims. The amount of time and attention 
diverted to the examination of the concepts outlined in the theory will 
provide a measure of the likelihood of the concepts which are thought to 
be important by other scholars. 
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